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“Over the past twenty years the theory of the firm, and of organization more generally, has 
grown into a substantial field of economic research. Yet, peculiarly little attention has been spent 
on understand the role of cooperatives…” (Holmstrom, p. 404). 
 
1. Introduction 
The federated business structure, a regional or national network of autonomous, local 
businesses or affiliates that share a brand or business function, exists in many sectors of the 
economy, especially in non-profit, purchasing, and agricultural sectors. Yet, we know little about 
this unique form of business and thus, can say little about why it continues to exist as an 
alternative to more mainstream corporate structures. The federated structure seems to exist as a 
substitute for internal growth or consolidation. Firms can achieve similar economies of scale, 
gain market share, and eliminate duplication of efforts through a jointly owned company while 
still retaining the advantages of independent identity and local connections (Carman; Knapp, 
1973; O’Flanagan and Taliento; Vilstrup, Cobia, and Cropp, 1989). However, recent summaries 
of the federated structure in non-profit and agricultural sectors suggest that the federated 
structure is struggling, that it no longer has a comparative advantage over other forms of 
organization in today’s business environment (O’Flanagan and Taliento; Dempsey et al., 2002; 
Dunn et al., 2002; Torgerson, Eversull, and Cummins, 2000).
1   
A federated system operates most efficiently when a single regional serves a captive set 
of local cooperatives (Figure 1). Since the local cooperatives own the regional and therefore 
serve as the residual claimants of the regional’s profits, they clearly have an incentive to 
patronize a single regional. In practice, however, “federations don’t always work as they should” 
(O’Flanagan and Taliento, p. 113). Regionals may compete with each other as well as with their 
non-federated competition for local business.
2 When local businesses fail to commit to a single 
regional, or choose to do business outside of the system, the entire structure weakens, even to the   2
point of collapse (Dahl; Ginder; Torgerson 1985).
3  Since no comprehensive data set for 
federated systems exist, the current behavior of the locals, their loyalty to the system, has not 
been analyzed empirically. Findings from qualitative and firm-specific studies support the 
premise that federated structures are not operating efficiently, that local businesses are not loyal 
to a single regional (Dahl; Hogeland; O’Flanagan and Taliento).  
One plausible neoclassical explanation for this seemingly irrational disloyalty is that 
growth and consolidation among locals has made the federated structure redundant. For example, 
16 of the 20 largest nonprofit organizations in the US operate within a federated structure 
(O’Flanagan and Taliento). Consolidation in agriculture over the past two decades has resulted in 
the unprecedented growth of local and regional cooperatives. Many local co-ops are now large 
enough to do business directly with wholesale and retailers, bypassing the regionals altogether 
(Frederick et al., 2002; Wadsworth 1999; Fulton and King, 1993). Do larger local businesses still 
need a second-tier regional structure or are they able to capture the same benefits with a different 
structure (e.g., partnerships or operating independently)?   
The theory of the firm, as propounded by Hansmann, Williamson, and others, offers an 
alternative explanation for disloyalty in the federated system. The relevant “agents” or decision-
makers in the system are the local owners (or the local board members who represent the 
owners) and the local mangers. In many firms, including cooperatives, the managers are 
effectively in control since they make the day-to-day business decisions (Hart and Moore, 1998). 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) have shown theoretically that alternative employee incentive 
systems create different optimal organizational structures. If locals are failing to commit to a 
single regional it may be connected to the actions (and incentives) of their managers. Assuming 
no agency problem, the managers may be directed or induced to produce outcomes that are not   3
compatible with system fealty (e.g., finding the lowest prices). Agency problems may arise, 
however, from the manager’s non-excludable, private incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom). 
These incentives could foster either more or less loyalty to a single regional, depending on the 
characteristics of the manager (e.g., interest in career opportunities). As Fulton (2001) shows, 
leadership in participatory organizations may rationally pursue strategies that lead to what he 
calls “organizational failure,” the failure to perform efficiently.  
The purpose of this paper is to explore (theoretically and empirically) the current 
dynamics of the federated system. We do so in context of the US farm supply and grain 
marketing sectors. Federated cooperatives have a long history of strategic importance in these 
sectors and many of the regional are major corporations.
4 Today, cooperatives handle 
approximately 38 percent of all grain/oilseed marketing and supply 26 percent of all farm 
production inputs in the US and the majority of these cooperatives are part of a federated system 
(Kraenzle and Eversull, 2003; Kraenzle et al., 2002). During the last decade (1990-2000), the 
number of local grain marketing co-ops decreased from 1,402 to 797, while the number of 
regionals fell from 5 to 2 (USDA RBCS). Within the farm supply sector, over the same period, 
the number of locals declined from 1,655 to 1,233 and the regionals, 18 to 13 (USDA RBCS). 
Consolidation of regionals and locals explain most of this trend (Wadsworth 1999), although 
some locals and regionals have also either opted out of the federated system completely or have 
adopted hybrid structures with federated and centralized characteristics.
 5 This suggests that at 
least some cooperatives have found the federated system sub-optimal.  
A comprehensive survey was sent to over 600 local, federated grain marketing and farm 
supply cooperatives in the Upper Midwest in 2003. The focus on the Midwest is justified for two 
reasons: it is home to the largest farm supply and grain marketing regional cooperatives (and by   4
extension, the most extensive federated systems) and the majority of the structural change within 
the federated system has also taken place in this region. The survey results provide interesting 
statistics regarding the loyalty between local and regional farm supply and grain marketing 
cooperatives in seven different federated systems.  
A theoretical model that extends the work of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) shows the 
impacts associated with alternative management incentive systems on federated structure loyalty. 
The results are tested empirically using two different sets of regressions and a panel data set that 
captures local co-op purchasing and grain marketing patterns for seven different regionals. The 
panel data approach lets us compare commitment levels across regionals, an important 
consideration given the diversity of regional cooperatives captured in our data.  
By focusing on a unique, but important form of ownership, our inquiry contributes to the 
theory of the firm literature in the tradition of Hansmann’s seminal work. Is the federated system 
functioning as it should, or are local firms disloyal? In either case, what explains the behavior of 
the locals, or in a more general sense what economic factors explain the federated structure? Our 
analysis also provides some insight into the long-term viability of the structure and, therefore, 
should be of interest to a wide group of policymakers. Those interested in the welfare of farmers 
and the efficiency of the agricultural sector as well as those interested in promoting alternatives 
to the conventional corporation model. If the federated structure no longer serves the needs of its 
locals (due to growth or external competition), we can expect that local businesses will find 
alternative forms of organization. If, however, it is related to management incentives, the 
federated structure may evolve to better meet the requirements of the locals or management 
contracts may have to change to solve agency problems.    5
The paper proceeds as follows. Additional background on the federated cooperative 
structure and the relevant theory that underscores the testable hypotheses and our econometric 
models are provided in the subsequent section. The econometric models used to analyze local co-
op patronage of regional co-ops are presented in section three, followed by a more detailed 
description of the survey methodology and panel data set, including some descriptive statistics 
that inform the econometric model specification in section four. The econometric results are 
reviewed in section five accompanied by a discussion of the implications for the future of the 
federated structure. The final section summarizes the article’s main findings. 
2. An Incentive-based Model for Federated Cooperatives 
There are no significant entry or exit barriers to regional cooperatives. Local co-ops are 
under no contract to do business with any regional of which they are a member and further, 
membership typically only requires patronage (and meeting the cooperative eligibility 
requirement). When local co-ops do patronize a regional, they build up allocated equity in the 
regional cooperative. The regional redeems a portion of the patronage refunds (the annual profits 
created by member business) as cash each year to the locals. The remainder is added to the local 
co-op’s allocated equity and will be redeemed to them at some point in the future.
6 The 
percentage of patronage refunds returned as cash and equity redemption practices vary across 
cooperatives.  
Given this free market environment, we can define three possible federated system 
scenarios: (1) the local co-op is completely loyal to a single regional cooperative, purchasing all 
possible goods and services from that regional (they cannot obviously buy what the regional 
doesn’t sell); (2) the local co-op is not loyal and either (a) encourages regionals to compete with 
each other for its business or (b) encourages regionals to compete with non-cooperatives for its   6
business; and (3) the local co-op is antagonistic to the system, choosing to purchase everything 
from a non-cooperative despite having equity built up in regionals. Whether or not the local 
cooperative fits any of the scenarios is largely at the discretion of the local co-op’s CEO or 
general manager. The local co-op manager acts as an agent for the local co-op’s board (the 
principals). The board can direct the behavior of the manager in two ways: (1) direct orders or 
(2) compensation incentives—bonuses or commissions (they cannot purchase any 
membership/ownership stock in cooperatives). Managers, however, also have their own personal 
incentives, such as their ability to find future employment (their marketability). Strategic and 
organization theory tells us that managerial commitment to any system is largely a function of 
their satisfaction. Thus, agency problems may arise.
7  
The orientation of the local co-op’s directives (i.e., the level of regional loyalty they try to 
achieve) and the factors that drive their orientation have not yet been established in the 
cooperative literature. For such an important institution, especially in agriculture, the federated 
structure has received remarkably little scholarly attention.
8 Dahl (1991) synthesized case studies 
of federated grain marketing cooperatives to assess reasons behind (or just descriptive?) their 
structural change. Hogeland (2001) interviewed thirty local co-op managers to form some 
general conclusions about the changing relationship between local and regional cooperatives. 
Her findings suggest loyalty to a regional depends is largely a function of price and the local’s 
cooperative culture. For example, she states that some local cooperatives encourage regional 
competition in order to receive the best price: “For locals…all that matters is that the regional be 
the lowest bid today” (p. 8). Hogeland also argues that attitudes towards cooperatives and 
business norms (the “co-op culture”) dictate the standards locals use to evaluate regionals. 
Homogeneity (or congruence) of culture and values between a local and regional would imply   7
greater trust and in turn, greater loyalty (Carman). Trust is the “ideological glue” that is essential 
for cooperative success: “Without trust, cooperative alliances may be little more than reactions to 
threatening market conditions” (Carman, p. 15). This suggests that regional loyalty may not be a 
function of a particular federated system but rather idiosyncratic to the local cooperatives. 
 The question of what factors influence individual producer or consumer member 
commitment to cooperatives has received fairly substantial treatment in the literature (e.g., 
Cotterill, 1987; Sexton 1986 and 1990; Karantininis and Zago, 2001; Fulton, 1999; Fulton and 
Giannakas, 2001; Zeuli and King). Since this is analogous to a local co-op’s commitment to a 
regional (minus the influence of the manager), some findings from this body of literature are 
relevant. Member satisfaction, defined as the degree to which they believe the co-op is serving 
their interests, is a key variable in determining member commitment or loyalty (Fulton and 
Giannakas). Member satisfaction (and commitment) is positively influenced by the specialization 
of the cooperative, member homogeneity, and dependency (Fulton and Giannakas; Izraeli, 
Pizam, and Neumann).
9 The more the member’s success depends upon the success of the 
cooperative, the greater the degree of their commitment (Fulton and Giannakas). 
Translating these findings to the federated system context, if the local co-op’s board 
(representing its members) feels the regional is not serving their needs, we would expect them to 
advance disloyal directives to management. The directives (and satisfaction) should be regional 
specific. For example, some regionals have already changed their orientation in response to lack 
of member loyalty, concentrating on becoming higher valued “food companies” rather than 
commodity-based agencies (Dahl, 1991; Hogeland). Therefore, some locals feel their regionals 
are no longer focused on serving their needs, but rather on growing their food business   8
(Hogeland; Torgerson, Eversull, and Cummins). We would expect locals that use specialized 
regionals (e.g., in grain marketing) to have more positive perceptions (satisfaction).  
We also expect local co-op characteristics to influence their satisfaction and commitment. 
The underlying assumption of the federated structure is that local co-ops will base their 
patronage decision primarily on economy of scale factors. Since smaller locals are less likely to 
procure the same favorable terms of trade as the regional (or a larger local) (i.e., they are more 
dependent on the regional), we would expect them to direct management to purchase only from a 
single regional. Dependency also may be linked the amount of equity the local cooperative has 
invested in the regional. If the regional cooperative fails, the local will lose their investment. 
However, there is a timing issue here. If the local already believes the regional is failing, they 
will do business elsewhere to avoid increasing their equity (and potential loss). Thus, the 
importance of the regional equity to the local becomes a significant variable. For some locals, the 
regional is essentially keeping them solvent (Dempsey; Torgerson et al).  
Equity redemption, the period of time the local has to wait to receive the equity it has 
built up in a regional, is equally important. Locals will feel more comfortable investing in the 
regional (through continued patronage) if they are more certain it will be returned; certainty 
increases as the timing of the future event decreases. Following the same logic, the percentage of 
patronage refunds returned annually as cash (versus accruing as equity) would also clearly 
increase a local’s willingness to patronize a regional. In sum, we would expect locals that feel 
their regional equity is very important to their future viability to issue regional loyalty directives. 
However, in regionals with long (or unknown) equity redemption periods and low annual cash 
patronage payouts, we would expect locals to be less loyal.   9
Economies of scope may also enter the loyalty equation. A growing percentage of 
consumer members, especially in farm supply cooperatives, is a national trend that reflects an 
increase in the number of non-farm families moving to rural areas (Merlo, 2003). The more 
diverse the cooperative (the more products and services it provides to its members), the higher 
the probability they will find better prices for at least some of their products outside a single 
regional. Thus, we would expect very diverse cooperatives to direct management to find the best 
price rather than stay loyal to a single regional.  
Building on Holmstrom and Milgrom’s model, the manager can choose to patronize 
regionals j = 1, …, J and IOFs f = 1, …, F, where the total purchased from each is represented by 
Tjf. with the full vector of patronage levels denoted by P = (P1, …, PJ+F). Let ,, ,
,
/ jf jf jf
jf
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P = ∑ . The manager’s choice of P can be directly observed by the 
board of directors and can either be directly or indirectly controlled by the board. If the board 
chooses to control the manager’s choice indirectly, it will offer commission based on a collection 
of verifiable measures X = (X1, …., XK), which can be thought of as the price of inputs the 
manager buys or the price of grain that is marketed. To be more general, it could represent the 
local co-op’s net revenues. X is a function of regional and non-regional patronage: 
 (1)  i i i P F X ε + = ) (   i = 1,…, K. 
We further assume that X is an increasing (monotonic) function of P; as the set within P--the 
number of nonzero Pj,l’s increases, so does X. This assumption is supported by the idea that 
competition will lead to lower prices. The incentive scheme for each manager m can be modeled 
as follows: 
(2)  ∑ + =
i
i iX P X s β α ) , (   10
where the coefficients α = (α1, …, αK) are the commission rates and β is salary. Both are 
restricted to nonnegative numbers to avoid creating disincentives (e.g., hiding behavior and not 
working). If the board decides to control the manager’s patronage choices directly, α = 0 (this 
follows from the fact that X is a function of P). Alternatively, the co-op could tie the 
commissions to the manager’s use of one or more firms. For example, it could offer a 
commission =  1 = j P λ . However, for this to work, λ ≥ α and the manager would simply maximize 
the patronage of the chosen firm(s), creating the same effect as a higher base salary with the 
restriction.  
Managers also have non-excludable private returns associated with patronizing each 
regional, M(Pj), and IOFs, M(Pf). The term non-excludable means that the manager’s returns 
cannot be excluded by any contract. We assume the return from patronizing the regional is 
feeling positive about their contribution to the cooperative system out of loyalty to the 
cooperative movement. In contrast, the return from patronizing an IOF is improving their job 
marketability. The two private returns are mutually exclusive. The manager chooses P to 
maximize the following payoffs from the organizational design: 
(3) ) ( ) ( l j
i
i i P M P M X Y + + + =∑ β α . 
Assuming (without a loss of generality) that Xi is simply net revenue (X), and given the 
assumptions above, we achieve the following result,  
(4)  l l j j L J P P M P P M P Y / ) ( ' / ) ( ' ) ( ' + + = + α . 
3. Survey Methodology and Descriptive Statistics 
Managers from 113 local farm supply and grain marketing cooperatives across the 
Midwest, representing at least ten different federated cooperative systems, returned an extensive   11
mail survey in 2002-2003.
10  The responses were distributed relatively evenly among the four 
states (Table 1) and represent reasonable samples of the existing farm supply and grain 
marketing co-ops.
11 The majority of the respondents provided information on more than one 
regional, resulting in 349 total data points for regional information. On average, each local in the 
sample is a member of 2.5 regional cooperatives; the majority of the locals were members of the 
largest regionals—Farmland, Growmark, CHS, and Land O’Lakes, Agri, and AGP.  
The sample appears to adequately represent the nation in terms of local membership 
numbers, membership composition, and sales. On average, the local cooperatives comprise 924 
producer members and 1,675 consumer members and reported $16.8 million in gross sales in 
2001 (Table 1). The range of responses across the sample in all three categories is remarkable 
and indicates a diversity of local cooperatives in the Midwest. The cooperatives themselves are 
also diverse, selling an average of twelve different products and services. A small portion of the 
sample was specialized: eight sold only petroleum and consumer goods to their members and 
another eight only provided grain marketing. These cooperatives were excluded from the 
regression analysis.   
As expected, all of the locals have experienced some measure of growth during 1990-
2001. Thirty-four percent of the locals reported an increase in producer members and 41 percent 
an increase in consumer members. On average, producer membership numbers increased by 11 
percent while consumer membership numbers increased more dramatically by 66 percent.
12 The 
majority of locals in the sample (55 percent) reported an increase in gross sales; on average, 
gross sales grew by 58 percent. Perhaps not surprisingly, 45 percent of the locals in the sample 
reported an increase in the number of products and services they sell (although on average the 
number only grew from 10 to 12). Growth at the local level may be partially attributed to   12
mergers; 66 percent of the locals engaged in merger activities during 1990-2001. Interestingly, 
74 percent believe that additional merger activities are necessary for future viability.  
Management at the local cooperatives has remained fairly stable. On average, the 
managers have worked in their current position for over eleven years, although the sample was 
varied (0.25-30 years). Many of the managers had been previously employed at the cooperative. 
Total years of employment at the same cooperative averaged just over 16 years, with the 
maximum of 38 years. 
The local managers were also asked to report equity information, satisfaction, and 
purchasing patterns for each regional they patronized (table 2). Local investment in regionals 
varied. On average, the regionals returned the locals equity on a fourteen year cycle. The locals 
were asked to rank their satisfaction with the regionals in terms of prices, products, and services.  
4. Econometric Model Specification  
To test the theoretical results, we estimate two sets of regressions that measure using 
different metrics the extent of a local’s loyalty to the federated system. The first uses standard 
Tobit regression techniques to analyze local i’s patronage of regional j.  Here the proportion of 
business conducted with each regional is the dependent variable allowing us to investigate the 
determinants of doing more business with an individual regional. The second regression 
estimates the determinants of loyalty to the regional system using a loyalty index variable.  In 
this case loyalty is defined as a binary state where a loyal local purchases more than 75% of their 
goods from the federated system.  That equation is estimated as a probit model. 
For the tobit regression on business decisions, let the dependent variable (pct_all_ati) be 
defined as follows: Yij = proportion of total 2001 sales spent by the local i co-op on products at 
regional j. The dependent variable will be censored at zero and at one (100% purchased at a   13
single regional).  Thus, a double-censored Tobit model (Maddala), which takes this censoring 
into account, is appropriate.  For an individual data point with a vector of independent variables 
xi, and a vector of parameters to be estimated β, a double-censored Tobit is estimated as follows: 
   Y i
* = β'xi + εi     where 
   Y i  = 1      if  Yi
* ≥ 1 
   Y i = Yi
*     if 0 <Yi
* < 1 
   Y i = 0      if  Yi
* <  0. 
 
The estimation procedure for this model maximizes a standard Tobit likelihood function with the 
changes for upper censoring rather than the more common lower censoring at zero.  With 100 
percent as Y
u, the upper bound of our estimation, and Y
o denoting the lower bound, 0 percent, 
the likelihood function is as follows: 
 
where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function and Yi is the purchase share.  
The dependent and exogenous variables assumed to impact the functioning of the 
federated system are reported in Table 3.  We estimate the tobit model using each regional and 
local combination.  It describes the proportion of business given to a single regional as a function 
of variables describing i) the manager, ii) the local, and iii) the regional.  Among manager 
variables we hypothesize that managers will be more likely to patronize a regional the longer 
they have been in their position (Yrs_pos), if they have prior co-op experience (prior_coop), and 
if they have more total years in cooperatives (Total_yrs).  In terms of characteristics of the local, 
we include variables describing the scale and scope of the business as well as their recent and 
future plans of merger activity.  Locals who have higher sales (Sales), have recently merged 
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number of products (P_Growth) we expect to have lower levels of patronage of a single regional.  
In addition we include the number of years that the regional revolves its equity as a variable to 
describe the expected returns on equity in a regional.  We hypothesize that locals will be more 
likely to patronize regionals that revolve their equity more often.  We also include dummy 
variables for each of the regionals to control for regional specific effects. 
  The probit model uses data from each local and describes the loyalty of the local as a 
function of characteristics of its manager and its own business.  Due to the small number of data 
points and multicollinearity problems we use a reduced set of variables in the loyalty probit.  We 
use total sales as a measure of the scale of the local, hypothesizing that larger locals will be less 
loyal.  The manager’s own loyalty to the cooperative system is measured with prior experience in 
cooperatives, which is hypothesized to be positive.  In addition we include a measure of the 
importance the manager attaches to patronage refunds as a method of measuring the influence of 
patronage refunds on a local’s loyalty.  We hypothesize that the more important the patronage 
refunds are to the local, the higher the probability of them being loyal. 
 
5. Results  
  The results from the Tobit estimation in table 4 show relatively few significant variables.  
Nonetheless they do demonstrate the hypothesized effect of the character of regionals on 
business patterns.  In particular, locals do more business with regionals that revolve their equity 
more often.  In addition a number of the regional specific dummy variables are significant show 
that the intercept term for those particular regionals are significantly different from the intercept 
for the baseline regional CHS.  There is a relatively higher proportion of business done at 
Farmland and AGP than CHS and a lower proportion at Growmark and Agriliance.  Given the   15
insignificance of the other variables in our equation, we cannot accept any of the other 
hypotheses proffered.  
  Table 5 shows the results from the probit model on loyalty.  It shows that local managers 
who consider patronage refunds important have a higher probability of being loyal to the 
federated system.  We do not find any significant effect of either the manager’s prior tenure in 
the cooperative system or the size of the local, although both of these variables are positive.  
Overall the probit model confirms the importance of the patronage refunds to loyalty that were 
suggested by the importance of equity in the tobit model. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Our study of the federated business structure in the context of farm supply and grain 
marketing cooperatives suggests a complex relationship between independent local firms and 
their regionals. Data from 113 local cooperatives support the premise that few locals patronize a 
single regional, creating inefficiency within the federated structure system. On average, the 
locals hold membership in three regionals. The local co-ops are making a trade-off between their 
own individual co-op’s short term gain and the long-term viability of the system.  
One plausible explanation for this disloyalty is that growth and consolidation among 
locals has made the federated structure redundant. Our data clearly shows that local cooperatives 
have grown over the past decade, increasing in sales, the number of products and services they 
offer, and membership numbers. Some of this growth was due to mergers; the majority of the 
sample had merged since 1990. The size of the local co-op, as measured by gross annual sales, 
was included in both regressions, but was not significant. Management behavior may offer an 
alternative explanation. Years in their current position and prior years at the cooperative are used   16
as proxies for loyalty to the cooperative system. Loyalty to the system, we hypothesize, reduces 
disloyalty incentives. None of these variables were significant in the regressions. 
If the local co-op’s board (representing its members) feels the regional is not serving their 
needs, we would expect them to advance disloyal directives to management. A number of the 
regional specific dummy variables in our regression were significant. Controlling for other 
factors, there was a relatively higher proportion of business completed at a single regional in 
Farmland and AGP than CHS and a lower proportion at Growmark and Agriliance. Loyalty to a 
regional would, we expect, also depend on equity. In particular, locals do more business with 
regionals that revolve their equity more often and have more loyalty to a single regional when 
their regional’s patronage is very important to their viability.  
By focusing on a unique, but important form of ownership, our inquiry contributes to the 
theory of the firm literature in the tradition of Hansmann’s seminal work. Our analysis also 
provides some insight into the long-term viability of the structure and, therefore, should be of 
interest to a wide group of policymakers. Those interested in the welfare of farmers and the 
efficiency of the agricultural sector should take note... If the federated structure no longer serves 
the needs of its locals (due to growth or external competition), we can expect that local 
businesses will find alternative forms of organization. An alternative strategy (to demise) would 
be to increase the size and scope of regional cooperatives.  In fact, some regionals have merged 
and/or entered into joint ventures, and others have organized inter-regionals (e.g., CF Industries). 
If, however, it is related to management incentives, the federated structure may evolve to 
better meet the requirements of the locals or management contracts may have to change to solve 
agency problems. To change management behavior, they would have to change incentive 
system.    17
Endnotes
 
1 The recent bankruptcy of Farmland, a federated structure that grew into one of the largest farm 
supply cooperatives in the US, supports the argument that the federated structure is in trouble. 
2 Regional co-op territories, which once were fairly geographically distinct—especially in 
agriculture, now tend to overlap. This allows for greater competition. 
3 Dahl and Ginder point to the lack of local commitment to the regional as a primary reason for 
the collapse of Farmers Export Company in 1985, a federated regional grain marketing 
cooperative. Theoretically, one of the factors that influence the stability of such a structure (i.e., a 
non-cooperative game) is the long-term commitment of both sets of cooperatives to the system 
(Fulton, Popp, and Gray, 1996). 
4 CHS and Land O’Lakes, for example. 
5 Local and regional cooperatives with no affiliation to regionals are categorized as centralized 
cooperatives. The number of centralized regional co-ops in both sectors increased during that 
period (from 2 to 26 in grain and 15 to 24 in farm supply). Hybrid cooperatives (those combining 
federated and centralized structures) are categorized by the USDA as “mixed.” 
6 It appears on the local co-op’s balance sheet as investments in other co-ops. 
7 Managers may ignore the directives of the co-op board, their own incentives may outweigh the 
co-op’s, or they may manipulate the board into choosing a directive that is inefficient—that 
serves his or her own interests and not the members (Fulton 2001). 
8 A significant body of literature on the more general concept of vertical financial ownership 
(hierarchy) exists (e.g., Mahoney, 1992), but the focus is on explaining contracting versus 
ownership strategies. Some explain motives for vertical integration (see Mahoney p. 560; 568).  
   18
 
9 Member homogeneity implies similarity in culture and values, which in turn would be expected 
to foster more mutual trust.  
10 An extensive survey was mailed out to all existing local grain and farm supply cooperatives 
(608) in Illinois (176), Iowa (104), Minnesota (233), and Wisconsin (95). A total of 113 useable 
surveys were ultimately received, achieving a final response rate of 19%. This rather low 
response rate seems to have been caused by the comprehensive nature of the survey (13 pages) 
since a standard Dillman approach was used and the surveys were sent at what is a typically low-
peak business time (Pennings, Irwin, and Good, 2002). The response rate is typical for 
agricultural mail surveys (e.g., Hudson and Herndon; Pennings, Irwin, and Good, 2002). 
11 Response rates for each state are as follows: Illinois 13%, Iowa 23%, Minnesota 19%, and 
Wisconsin 24%. 
12 The majority of the cooperatives in the sample (62%) retain a producer orientation, meaning 
the ratio of consumer members to producer members is less than one.    19
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Illinois (23)  ---- 
Iowa (24)  ---- 
Minnesota (43)  ---- 
Wisconsin (23)  ---- 
Total (113)  ---- 
Regional memberships    
  AGP  (18)  ---- 
  AGRI  (12)  ---- 
  Agriliance  (11)  ---- 
  CHS  (88)  ---- 
  Co-Bank  (24)  ---- 
  Farmland  (65)  ---- 
  FC Stone  (10)  ---- 
  Growmark  (22)  ---- 
  Land  O’Lakes  (74)  ---- 
  Others
1 (25)  ---- 
Regional membership/local  2.5   0/10 
Size & Diversity    
Producer members   924   1/20,755 
Consumer members  1,675  30/11,500 
Gross sales ($ million)  16.8  0.1/161.9 
# of products and services sold   12  1/21 
Growth (1990-2001)  Percentage of responses 
(Percentage change) 
 
Locals with producer member growth   34%  ---- 
Locals with consumer member growth   41%  ---- 
Average % increase in producer members   (11%)  ---- 
Average % increase in consumer members  (66%)  ---- 
Locals with increase in gross sales   55%  ---- 
Average % increase in gross sales  (58%)  ---- 
Locals with increase in # of products and 
services sold 
45% ---- 
Engaged in mergers   66%  ---- 




Years in current position  11.4  0.25/30 
Total years at the cooperative  16.1  1/38 
1. Smaller regionals with fewer than 2 total responses were grouped in this category.   23
 









            




            
Importance of 




Satisfaction              
w/ prices               
w/ products               
w/ services               
             
1. Annual patronage refunds and % in cash were reported as averages over past five years. 
2. 0 = not at all; 1 = somewhat; 2 = very   24
 
 
Table 3. Independent and Dependent Variables 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Pct_Bus: Portion of business at regional j  0.329424 0.359943 0 1
Revolve: Number of years equity revolves at 
regional j 
14.36981 3.999886 11 20
Yrs_pos: Number of years local manager has 
held his/her position 
10.70802 7.82184 0.25 30
Prior_coop: If local manager has prior coop 
experience 
0.473684 0.500248 0 1
Total_yrs: Local manager’s total coop 
experience 
15.36641 9.432829 1 38
Sales: Total local sales in $millions  29.11276 36.42959 0.888241  230.2551
Merged: =1 if local merged in last the last 
decade 
0.77551 0.4181 0 1
Future_M: =1 if local believes future mergers 
are necessary 
0.852459 0.355373 0 1
P_Growth: =1 if the local grew its products 
in last decade 
0.596 0.491682 0 1
reg1: Farmland  0.209559 0.407744 0  1
reg2: Growmark  0.058824 0.235728 0  1
reg3: CHS (default value for regressions)  0.290441 0.45803 0  1
reg4: Land o’ Lakes  0.268382 0.443935 0  1
reg6: Agriliance  0.040441 0.197355 0  1
reg8: AGP  0.0625 0.242508 0  1
loyalty_12: =1 if 75% of business with 
regionals 
0.434783 0.498445 0 1
Patron_imp: Importance of patronage refund, 
=0 if none, =1 somewhat important, =2 very 
important 
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Table 4. Tobit Regression Results 
Dep = pct_bus 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Err.  t 
Revolve  -0.0618  0.023 -2.67
yrs_pos  -0.002  0.008 -0.26
prior_coop  -0.115  0.112 -1.02
total_years  0.003  0.008 0.37
sales  -0.001  0.001 -0.74
Merged  -0.094  0.105 -0.9
Future  -0.154  0.119 -1.29
P_Growth  -0.143  0.214 -0.67
reg1  0.734  0.250 2.93
reg2  -0.356  0.094 -3.77
reg4  -0.132  0.218 -0.6
reg6  -0.304  0.165 -1.84
reg8  1.586  0.321 4.94
_cons  -0.0618  0.023 -2.67
_se  0.488  0.036304  
N=198    
Log Likelihood  -151.47   
Pseudo R2  0.1632   
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Table 5. Probit regressions results 
Dep = loyalty_12 
Variables Coefficient  Std.  Err. z 
prior_coop 0.4096214  0.30689  1.33 
sales 6.90E-03  0.005449 1.27 
Patron_imp 0.7013162  0.283325 2.48 
_cons -1.606431  0.530392 -3.03 
N=75 
Log Likelihood = -46.45 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0971 
 
 